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Abstract
Static and dynamic equilibria in noisy binary choice games on
graphs are considered. Equations defining static quantal response
equilibria (QRE) for binary choice games on graphs with arbitrary
topology and noise distribution are written. It is shown that in the
special cases of complete graph and arbitrary noise distribution, and
circular and star topology and logistic noise distribution the resulting
equations can be cast in the form coinciding with that derived in the
earlier literature. Explicit equations QRE for non-directed graphs in
the annealed approximation are derived. It is shown that the resulting
effect on the phase transition is the same as found in the literature
on phase transition in the Ising model on graphs in the same ap-
proximation.Evolutionary noisy binary choice game having the earlier
described QRE as its stationary equilibria in the mean field approxi-
mation is constructed using the formalism of master equation.
1
1 Introduction
Taking into account direct not market-mediated economic/social interac-
tions, i.e. a direct dependence of agent’s utilities on the (expected) actions
of fellow agents, is believed to be of crucial importance for describing the
observed heterogeneity of economic/social multi-agent systems. The corre-
sponding literature that contains many practical applications of this idea is
covered in the review papers [3, 10]. Particularly interesting consequences
of such interactions are emergent nontrivial aggregate properties of these
systems.
At the same time the direct dependence of agent’s utilities on the (ex-
pected) actions of other agents is, by default, a key ingredient of game theory.
It is therefore natural to look at the consequences of economic/social interac-
tions in terms of emergent aggregate properties of game-theoretic equilibria.
Of direct relevance to the present paper is the literature on effects of
social/economic interactions on equilibria properties in noisy binary choice
problems on graphs with utility of a choice containing private and social com-
ponents where the former depends on idiosyncratic fixed characteristics and
noise and the latter depends on (expected) choices made by the agent’s neigh-
bours. The resulting description depends on the assumptions on the form of
this interaction, topology of a graph and specification of noise. Static equi-
libria and corresponding myopic dynamics for noisy binary choice problem
on complete graph were considered, for linear-quadratic utility and arbitrary
noise distribution, in [6, 2]. The particular case of linear-quadratic utility
and logistic noise was considered for several topologies, including complete
graph, star and circular ones1 in [15]. The main result of this literature is
in describing nontrivial emerging aggregate properties of equilibria which in
some special cases resemble or coincide with description of phases and phase
transitions in statistical physics. In particular, in the case of logistic noise
and complete graph and circular topologies the resulting equations describ-
ing static equilibria and dynamical evolution coincide with those describing
magnets in the mean field approximation. An inspiring discussion of par-
allels between noisy discrete decision problems in multiagent systems and
statistical physics can be found in [5], see also [9].
As has been already mentioned, a natural language for developing a con-
1The case of the circular topology was also considered in the influential early paper
[11].
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sistent description of the effects of economic/social interactions of a group
of agents is provided by game theory in which interdependence of agent’s
strategies is built in by construction through their utilities. The goal is then
to describe the corresponding game-theoretic equilibria. The randomness
present in agent’s decisions makes it necessary to describe these equilibria in
probabilistic terms. In the general case of interdependent random effects in-
fluencing agent’s decisions these are correlated equilibria [1]. In the simplest
case in which such random effects are assumed to be independent one looks
for equilibria in mixed strategies. Let us note that in game-theoretic litera-
ture randomness in agent’s utilities is considered as a possible fundamental
mechanism underlying formation of equilibria in mixed strategies 2 [14].
Of particular relevance to the present study is a specific implementa-
tion of the Harsanyi random utility mechanism [14] resulting in particular
Bayes-Nash mixed strategies equilibria in games with incomplete (due to
randomness in agent’s utilities) information - the Quantal Response Equilib-
ria (QRE) [17, 18, 12]. An important result of [17] was in deriving explicit
equations for equilibrium probability measure that were subsequently used
for describing many experimental game-theoretic results [12].
The main goal of this paper is to describe QRE equations and the prop-
erties of the corresponding equilibria for games corresponding to the noisy
binary choice model of [6] for graphs with arbitrary topology and noise distri-
butions in both static and dynamic settings 3. We show that in the particular
cases of complete, star and circular graph topology the QRE - defining equa-
tions are equivalent to the equilibrium-defining equations in [6] and, for a
particular choice of noise distributions, in [15]. We also consider QRE for
noisy binary choice games on random graphs in the annealed approximation
and derive an analytical equation defining them that, for a particular choice of
logistic noise distribution, coincides with the one known in statistical physics
on graphs [8]. For dynamic binary choice games we derive, using the for-
malism of master equation, evolution equations for local average choice and
show that static QRE equilibria constitute stationary points of a particular
myopic stochastic choice game considered in the mean field approximation.
In the particular case of a complete graph the resulting equation coincides
with the one derived in [2].
2An alternative explanation is through bounded rationality, see e.g. [7].
3Let us note that although the relevance of QRE in the context of discrete choice models
was already mentioned in the literature, see e.g. [15, 10], the explicit interrelation was not
discussed.
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2 Quantal response equilibria in static noisy
binary choice games
2.1 Noisy binary choice game
Let us define a noisy binary choice game considered in the paper:
• the game is played by N agents placed in the vertices of a graph G
characterised by the adjacency matrix g with gij = 1 corresponding to
an edge j → i and gij = 0 otherwise;
• Each agent solves a binary choice problem described by two alternative
pure strategies parametrised by si = ±1, i = 1, · · · , N ;
• the expected utility for an agent i from choosing the strategy si is as-
sumed to depend on his expectations with respect to strategies chosen
by his first neighbours {j ∈ νi} and an idiosyncratic random contribu-
tion:
〈Ui(si)〉 =
[
Hi +
∑
j∈νi
gijJij〈sj〉i
]
si + ǫsi, (1)
where Hi is an idiosyncratic bias towards choosing si = sign(Hi), the
social/economic interactions are parametrised by the matrix Jij de-
scribing the influence of the choice of strategy sj by the neighbour j.
The random contributions {ǫsi} are assumed to be privately known
independent (for i 6= j)) random variables with zero mean. For each
agent i distributions φ(i)(ǫsi) for ǫsi and ǫ−si are assumed to be the
same4. In what follows we denote this distribution by φ(i)(ǫsi). The
expectation values 〈sj〉i are average choices of the agents {j ∈ νi} com-
puted following agent’s i evaluation of the corresponding probabilities.
The choice of linear-quadratic form of the utility (1) is standard and
follows, in particular, the one in [6, 2].
4This assumption is necessary to be able to falsify predictions of the properties of
quantal response equilibrium, see [13].
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2.2 Non-random case
Let us first consider the ”unperturbed” version of (1) with the noise terms
switched off:
Ui(si) =
[
Hi +
∑
j 6=i
gijJijsj
]
si. (2)
The Nash equilibria in pure strategies (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
N) correspond to solutions
the system of equations characterising the best response strategies of the
agents
s∗i = η
(
Hi +
∑
j 6=i
gijJijs
∗
j
)
, (3)
where η(x) = sign(x) is a step function. Let us stress that an existence
of solutions of (2) is in general case not guaranteed and conditions of their
existence are not known. As for the Nash equilibria in mixed strategies,
to our knowledge they were not discussed. The interpretable solutions of
the system (3) can be found only in some drastically simplified versions of
the game under consideration. For example, for the case of complete graph,
Hi = 0 ∀ i and Jij = J/N > 0 ∀ i, j the two Nash equilibria in pure strategies
are s∗i = 1 ∀ i or s
∗
i = −1 ∀ i. In the particular case of symmetric matrices
gij and Jij the game is a potential one, see e.g. [16], with the potential of
the form
V ({σ}) =
∑
i
Hiσi +
1
2
∑
i,j
gijJijsisj (4)
and, as proven in [16], possesses therefore at least one Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
2.3 Quantal response equilibrium
Taking into account the noise terms in (1) requires characterising the cor-
responding equilibria in probabilistic terms. In the general case in which
random utility components {ǫsi} are dependent such equilibria are charac-
terised by multinomial probability distributions
P eq ({s}) = P eq (s1, s2, ... sN) (5)
denoting the probability of having an equilibrium characterised by the set of
strategies (s1, s2, · · · sN ). Such equilibria can be classified as correlated [1].
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With the above-described standard assumption of independence of {ǫsi}
for different agents used in the subsequent analysis one gets a factorised
distribution
P eq ({s}) = P eq1 (s1)P
eq
2 (s2) ... P
eq
N (sN) (6)
corresponding to Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies parametrised by the
corresponding noise-induced set of equilibrium probabilities {peqsi }, where
{peqsi ≡ P
eq
i (si)} and {p
eq
si=1
+ peqsi=−1 = 1}.
The agent’s choices are now governed by expected utility (1). From (1)
it follows that the probability psi of choosing the strategy si by the agent i
is
psi = F
(i)
<
([
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJij〈sj〉(i)
]
si
)
, (7)
where F
(i)
< (z) is a distribution function for ǫ−si − ǫsi
F
(i)
< = Prob [ǫ−si − ǫsi < z] =
∫ z
dz1f
(i)(z1), (8)
where, in turn, f (i)(z1) =
∫
dz2 φ
(i)(z2)φ
(i)(z2 + z1) is the differential distri-
bution of z1 = ǫ−si − ǫsi
5. In particular, for the probability psi=1 of choosing
si = 1 one has
psi=1 ≡ p+i = F
(i)
<
(
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJij〈sj〉(i)
)
, (9)
The quantal response equilibrium (peq+1, · · · , p
eq
+N) is then defined [17, 18,
12] as a consistent set of mixed strategies used by agents and their expecta-
tions concerning the mixed strategies used by their neighbouring agents, i.e.
fullfilment for ∀j, i of the equality
〈sj〉(i) = 2p
eq
+j − 1 (10)
which then leads to the following system of equations for the QRE probabil-
ities {peq+i}:
6
peq+i = F
(i)
<
(
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJij(2p
eq
+j − 1)
)
, ∀i. (11)
5It is easy to check that the probabilities (7) satisfy psi + p−si = 1.
6An expression of this sort containing some arbitrary linear combination of probabilities
in the right-hand side is provided, without reference to QRE, in [10] .
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It is convenient to rewrite (11) as a system of equations on the equilibrium
expectations/local averages meqi = 2p
eq
+i − 1:
meqi = 2F
(i)
<
(
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJijm
eq
j
)
− 1 (12)
2.3.1 Simple topologies
Let us consider the particular realisation of equations (12) for the simplest
characteristic topologies of complete, star-like and circular graphs. In this
section we will assume for simplicity that for complete graph Jij = J/N , for
star-like and circular ones Jij = J and F
(i)
< (z) = F<(z) for all i, j.
The appearance of the 1/N factor in Jij = J/N for the complete graph
and the absense of analogous rescalings for star-like and circular topologies
requires a special comment. In statistical physics such rescaling is necessary
for ensuring additivity of free energy in the number of spins. In generic
statistical physics models on nontrivial graphs no rescaling with respect to
the number of nearest neighbours like that assumed in [15, 10] is imposed. In
particular, the absence of such rescaling is crucial for obtaining a description
of phase transitions for arbitrary topologies in the annealed approximation
that coincides with the corresponding results obtained for phase transitions
on graphs in statistical physics [8], see below.
1. Complete graph
Let us first consider the case of the complete graph. In this case equi-
librium strategies of all agents are the same meqi = m
eq ∀i. The cor-
responding QRE is fully characterised, in the limit N → ∞, by the
corresponding simplification of the equation (12)
meq = 2F< (2H + 2Jm
eq)− 1, (13)
i.e. the Curie-Weiss equation obtained in [6, 2]. It is thus established
that the equilibria studied in [6, 2] are the quantal response ones.
Let us also mention that in the case H = 0 the space of solutions of
(13) undergoes transformation (”phase transition”) at
4Jf(0) = 1 (14)
such that at 4Jf(0) < 1 one has only the solution meq = 0 while at
4Jf(0) > 1 there appear additional solutions ±meq 6= 0.
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2. Star-like graph
In the star-like configuration one has two kinds of nodes: the central
and periphery ones. Let us index the central node by i = 1 and denote
the average choice at i = 1 by m1 and for i = 2, · · · , N by m−1. Then
the equations (12) take the form
meq1 = 2F<
(
2H + 2J [N − 1]meq−1
)
− 1
meq−1 = 2F< (2H + 2Jm
eq
1 )− 1 (15)
Up to normalisation in the interaction term and for the special case of
logistic noise distribution equations (15) coincide with those derived in
[15] and, therefore, the corresponding equilibria are QRE ones.
3. Circular graph
For the circular topology the equations (12) take the form
meqi = 2F<
(
2H + 2J [meqi−1 +m
eq
i+1]
)
− 1 (16)
which, again, up to normalisation in the interaction term and for the
special case of logistic noise distribution equations (16) coincide with
those derived in [15] and, therefore, the corresponding equilibria are
QRE ones.
2.3.2 Annealed approximation
Let us now consider the quantal response equilibrium described by (12) on
undirected graphs with arbitrary topology in the so-called annealed approxi-
mation, see e.g. the review [8]. In tis approximation the matrix elements gij
are replaced by probabilities of formation of an edge between the nodes i, j
with degrees ki, kj in the configuration model for random graphs
gij ≃
kikj
N〈k〉
(17)
and, therefore, an incomplete unweighted graph is transformed into a com-
plete weighted one7 with weights given by (17). This is the only approxima-
tion allowing to get analytical description of critical phenomena on tree-like
graphs with arbitrary degree distribution and therefore having applications
7Note the reappearance in (17) of the 1/N factor.
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to many problems in statistical physics of spin systems, epidemics, synchro-
nization, etc. on graphs, see e.g. [8]. The essence of this approximation is
in assuming the same properties (e.g. average strategies) hold for all agents
placed in the nodes of the same degree and, therefore, providing a compact
account of the node’ s heterogeneity. Let us note that by construction the
annealed approximation (17) works better for high degree nodes and, due to
the fact that degree distribution of a giant cluster, on which such critical phe-
nomena are usually studied, is biased towards higher degrees, the accuracy
of the annealed approximation is often quite reasonable.
The QRE-defining system of equations (12) can then be rewritten in the
form
meqki = 2F<
(
2H + 2Jki
∑
k
kπk
〈k〉
meqk
)
− 1, (18)
where {πk} is the degree distribution of the graph G and
meqk = 〈σj〉|
eq
kj=k
(19)
denotes equilibrium averages for agents having k direct neighbours. Equa-
tions (19) can conveniently be rewritten as an equation on the weighted
average
meqw =
∑
k
kπk
〈k〉
meqk , (20)
so that the corresponding generalized Curie-Weiss equation for mw takes the
form
meqw =
∑
k
kπk
〈k〉
2F< (2H + 2Jkm
eq
w )− 1 (21)
Let us note that for H = 0 the transformation of solution space for mw take
place at
4J〈k2〉f(0) = 〈k〉 (22)
Equation (22) generalizes the corresponding equation for the complete graph
(14) so that one has the following transformation of the condition on the
phase transition point:
4Jf(0) = 1 ⇒ 4Jf(0) =
〈k〉
〈k2〉
(23)
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which is a well-known effect in critical phenomena on graphs in the annealed
approximation [8]. For the often considered case of logistic F<(z) the equa-
tion (22) coincides with that obtained in the same approximation for the
Ising model on graphs [8].
3 Dynamics
Let us now consider an evolutionary version on the static noisy binary choice
game on graphs described in the Section 2. The corresponding dynamics
can generically be described as an evolution of the multinomial probability
distribution
P ({s}(t)) = P (s1, s2, ... sN |t) (24)
describing the probability of observing a configuration of strategies {s}(t) ≡
(s1, s2, ... sN)(t) at time t. The evolution is triggered by strategy revisions
si → −si and is fully specified by describing how do revision possibilities
occur and the corresponding probabilities {p−si(t)} for an agent i, once given
a chance to reconsider the current choice at time t, to choose the strategy si.
In describing the dynamical evolution of P ({s}(t)) we will assume that
it is driven by the strategy-switching transitions si(t) → −si(t), so that in
a given infinitesimal time interval one van have only one such flip for some
agent. The underlying picture is that at some small time interval (t, t+∆t)
only one agent i gets a possibility of strategy revision. The overall probability
of strategy revision −si → si is thus
Prob [−si → si](t,t+∆t) = λi(t, t+∆t) psi (25)
where λi(t, t+∆t) is the probability of giving an agent i possibility of recon-
sidering the current strategy on time interval (t, t+∆t). Moreover, we assume
that probability of strategy selection during the reconsidering is independent
from the current state. Assuming, analogously to [2], independent Poisso-
nian generation of time points at which strategy reconsideration is possible
we get, using (25), the following evolution equation (master equation) (see
e.g. [19]):
dP (s1, s2, ... sN |t)
dt
= λ
∑
i
[psiP (s1, ... − si, ... sN |t)−
p−siP (s1, · · · , si, · · · sN |t)] (26)
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where λ is a constant describing the intensity of the Poisson process. From
the master equation (26) there follow equations for the moments. In par-
ticular, the evolution equations for the local averages mi(t) = 〈si〉P ({s}(t))
reads
dmi(t)
dt
= −2〈sip−si〉P ({s}(t)) (27)
The ultimate goal is in describing asymptotic regimes of (26) at t→∞,
in particular the possibility of stationary asymptotic regimes such that
dP ({s}(t))
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→∞
→ 0 (28)
so that the evolution ends up with forming a stationary equilibrium distri-
bution
P ({s}(t))|t→∞ → P
eq ({s}) (29)
In the present study we restrict our analysis to the case of mixed strategy
equilibria in which agent’s decisions are taken independently which in terms
of the probability distribution P ({s}(t)) enforces using the factorized mean
field approximation :
P ({s}(t)) ⇒ Pmf ({s}(t)) =
N∏
i=1
psi(t) (30)
and, therefore, stationarity of P ({s}(t)) does directly imply that of the choice
probabilities psi(t) and, therefore, of the local averages mi(t) = 〈si〉psi(t):
dP ({s}(t))
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→∞
→ 0 =⇒
dpsi(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→∞
→ 0 =⇒
dmi(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→∞
→ 0
(31)
Mechanisms determining the flip rate can in principle include memory
effects, i.e. dependence of {psi} on past configurations of strategies, see e.g.
[5] and/or forward-looking behaviour, see e.g. [4]. In this study we will use,
following [2] and the earlier literature, the simplest myopic assumption so that
a decision on the strategy flip depends only only on the current configuration
of strategies at neighbouring nodes. In analogy with [2] the expression for the
flip rate is then naturally chosen as a myopic (local time-dependent) version
of (7):
p−si = F
(i)
<
(
−
[
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJijsj
]
si
)
. (32)
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The general evolution equations for mi(t) (27) can be further simplified
by using the identity
p−si =
1
2
[1− si(sipsi − sip−si)] =
1
2
[1− si〈si〉] (33)
Then, using equations ((27),(32),(33),(30)), we get the following evolution
equations for the local averages mi(t):
dmi(t)
dt
= −λ
{
mi(t)−
[
2F
(i)
<
(
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJijmj(t)
)
− 1
]}
. (34)
This equation is approximate, however its validity can be proven for some
graphs in the limit of large number of neighbours. The evolutionary dynamics
equilibria correspond to the (stable) stationary points of (34):
dmi(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→∞
= 0 =⇒ mi = 2F
(i)
<
(
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJijmj
)
− 1 (35)
which are exactly the QRE static equilibria of (12). Therefore in the mean
field approximation (30) the dynamic equilibria of the above-described evo-
lutionary game with the myopic choice probabilities (32) are the QRE of the
noisy binary choice game described in the section 2. An important point here
is that not all stationary points of the dynamics (34) are stable. The stabil-
ity of dynamical equilibria can be straightforwardly analyzed by expanding
the right-hand side of (34) to the second order in perturbations around the
corresponding equilibrium values and checking whether these are growing or
diminishing in time. One can check that for stability it is necessary that the
real parts of all eigenvalues of stability matrix
Sij = δij − 4f
(i)
(
2Hi + 2
∑
j
gijJijmj
)
gijJij (36)
are positive.
In the simplest case of a complete graph and assuming Jij = J/N , Hi = H
and F
(i)
< (z) = F<(z) for all i, j the evolution equation (34) takes the form
dm(t)
dt
= −λ {m(t)− [2F<(2H + 2Jm)− 1]} (37)
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thus reproducing the answer obtained in the framework of population dy-
namics formalism in [2]. In the nontrivial phase of the model with H = 0
corresponding to 4Jf(0) > 1 it is easy to check that the solution m = 0 is
dynamically unstable, see analogous conclusion for the myopic dynamics for
logistic F<(0) in [6].
For the star and circular topologies and logistic F<(z) the equations (34)
coincide, after appropriate coupling rescaling, with those derived in [15].
4 Conclusions and outlook
Let us summarize the main results obtained in the present study:
• Equations defining quantal response equilibria in noisy binary games
on graphs with arbitrary topology and arbitrary noise distributions
were derived both for probabilities and local averages. An equivalence
to the known results in the case of complete graph, star and circular
topologies was estableshed.
• Equations defining quantal response equilibrium in the annealed ap-
proximation for the underlying graph topology were derived and cor-
responding phase transition points identified. For the logistic noise
distribution the answer was shown to be equivalent to that obtained in
the framework of Ising model on graphs studied in statistical physics.
• Master equation for evolution of the multinomial probability distri-
bution describing evolution of strategies configuration and the corre-
sponding evolution equations for local averages were derived.
• It was shown that for a natural myopic dynamics the stationary points
of dynamical evolution equations (some of them unstable) correspond
to the static QRE equilibria.
The present study dealt only with the subset of important issues related
to developing a concise game-theoretic understanding of noisy discrete choice
games on graphs. An incomplete list of the problems to be analyzed includes
studying correlated equilibria, multinomial choice for arbitrary noise, effects
of violation of detailed balance, possibility of developing a potential game
description, etc.
13
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